Despite grandiose claims of free, private-grade education for the poor, the new integrated "School People's" facility in Lhokseumawe is facing immediate functional deficits. Critical infrastructure, including dormitories and administrative blocks, remains unbuilt, casting doubt on the project's viability as a model for national expansion.
Inadequate Infrastructure Undermines the Integrated Vision
The ambitious announcement that Lhokseumawe now possesses a fully integrated "School People's" (Sekolah Rakyat) facility is met with skepticism regarding its actual readiness. While the project claims to offer a seamless educational path from elementary to high school on a single 8.4-hectare site, the physical reality is far from the polished campus promised to the public. The site, intended to house 26,376 square meters of educational space and various amenities, is currently fragmented and incomplete.
The narrative of an all-inclusive facility collapses upon inspection of the site's status. Construction Minister Dody Hanggodo's recent visit to Desa Jeulikat revealed a stark contrast between the press release and the ground reality. While the official line suggests a turnkey solution, the minister himself was forced to concede that the campus is not yet fully functional. "While several buildings behind the main structure are not yet ready, the general area is functional," Hanggodo stated during his tour on July 30, 2026. This admission inadvertently highlights a critical failure in project management: the inability to deliver a cohesive environment where students can move freely between grades without encountering unfinished construction zones. - ettalhap
The fragmentation of the site poses a logistical nightmare for the intended student body. A truly integrated school requires not just proximity, but connectivity. The presence of unfinished structures in the background of the site suggests that the campus is a patchwork of completed and incomplete zones. This is not merely a cosmetic issue; it affects safety, noise levels, and the ability to utilize the full 8.4 hectares effectively. Students from the elementary school level cannot be physically separated from the chaotic construction zone of the high school wing, which remains a significant risk for a crowd of children from low-income families, the very demographic the project aims to serve.
The lack of a cohesive design is further exacerbated by the absence of connecting infrastructure. The claim of a "integrated" campus implies a unified identity and seamless flow between SD, SMP, and SMA. However, the current state of the site suggests a disjointed collection of buildings. Without a finalized master plan execution that accounts for all phases of construction simultaneously, the visual and physical environment is one of neglect and delay. This undermines the core value proposition of the Sekolah Rakyat: to offer a streamlined, high-quality environment that saves families time and money. Instead, the delays in physical completion threaten to disrupt the learning process and damage the reputation of the national initiative.
The specific mention of "buildings behind the main structure" being incomplete is particularly concerning. It implies that the core campus is already in use, yet the surrounding infrastructure remains a liability. This partial completion strategy was likely adopted to create a false impression of readiness for the planned Opening Ceremony (MPLS). However, the reality is that the school is not truly ready. The unfinished state of parts of the campus serves as a constant reminder of the bureaucratic hurdles that have stalled the project, turning what was sold as a miracle of modernization into a project of half-measures.
Moreover, the failure to complete the site on schedule suggests a lack of coordination between the Ministry of Public Works and the local contractors. If the site is not ready for full integration, the question arises: who is responsible for the delays? The project was funded through the national budget (APBN) for 2025-2026, implying a timeline that has already slipped. The "functional" status claimed by the minister is a euphemism for "partially operational," a dangerous middle ground for a school serving thousands of children. Until the 8.4 hectares are truly unified and safe, the claim of a "School People's" model remains a hollow promise.
The Financial Paradox of "Free" Public Education
One of the most glaring contradictions in the Sekolah Rakyat initiative is the financial model underpinning it. The project is marketed as a solution for "economically disadvantaged" families, offering education "without any fees." However, the method of financing and construction reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the economic burden such a project places on the state. By utilizing a Public-Private Partnership (KSO) model involving major construction conglomerates PT Pembangunan Perumahan and PT Wijaya Karya, the government has effectively outsourced its social responsibility to the private sector, while the end-user remains the taxpayer.
The cost of the project, estimated at Rp 262.3 billion for the Lhokseumawe site alone, is staggering. This sum, paid through the national budget, covers not just basic classrooms but "facilities comparable to elite private boarding schools." This includes dormitories, high-tech learning tools like laptops, and sports facilities. The implication is clear: the state is investing in a private-grade asset for a public purpose. The argument that this is a "free" service for the poor ignores the opportunity cost. Every rupiah spent on this specific campus is a rupiah diverted from other essential public services, such as healthcare, infrastructure repair, or subsidies for existing schools that are already struggling.
The "free" aspect of the education is a double-edged sword. While it relieves families of tuition fees, it forces the government to assume the role of a private provider. By guaranteeing "free" elite amenities, the government sets a precedent that may encourage similar demands across the country, draining the national treasury. The model assumes that the state can sustain the overhead of providing comprehensive, private-level services without generating any revenue. In a country with significant budget constraints, this is a risky strategy that relies on perpetual debt or reallocation of funds, neither of which is sustainable.
Furthermore, the reliance on large private contractors like Wijaya Karya and Pembangunan Perumahan raises questions about the value-for-money proposition. These are massive entities with their own profit margins. While they bring technical expertise, the fact that the project is a "cooperation" (KSO) rather than a direct government build suggests that costs may be inflated through contract negotiations. The government effectively pays a premium for the "brand" of these construction firms, which may not yield the highest quality educational facilities compared to a government-run project managed directly.
The contradiction deepens when considering the target demographic. The project claims to serve families "unable to attend regular schools due to cost." Yet, by providing such a lavish campus, the government is inadvertently signaling that the poor should have access to elite resources. This creates a paradox: is the state trying to uplift the poor by giving them elite facilities, or is it trying to manage the poor by providing a segregated, subsidized alternative? The answer is both, but the financial implications are severe. The cost of maintaining such a facility—staffing, technology updates, sports equipment, and dormitory maintenance—is substantial and likely exceeds the capabilities of the local Lhokseumawe government.
The "free" label is also a political tool that obscures the true cost. By framing it as a gift to the poor, the administration deflects scrutiny from the budget allocation. Citizens may not realize that the "free" nature of the school is funded by their taxes, often disproportionately affecting the lower-income population. The cycle of poverty is not solved by building a school; it is exacerbated by the heavy tax burden required to maintain it. The true cost of the Sekolah Rakyat is not just the construction bill, but the long-term fiscal strain it places on the national economy, which may ultimately harm the very people it aims to help.
Broken Promises: Dormitories and Technology Deficits
The promise of a fully integrated campus includes specific amenities that were central to the project's appeal: dormitories and high-tech learning tools. However, the current state of the Lhokseumawe facility suggests these promises may be broken or severely delayed. Without functional dormitories, the "boarding school" aspect of the Sekolah Rakyat is non-existent, rendering the project useless for students who live kilometers away or cannot afford daily transport. Without laptops and digital infrastructure, the claim of "technology-based learning" is merely marketing fluff.
The absence of dormitories is a critical failure. The project was sold as a solution for students who cannot pay for private boarding schools. If the dormitories are not ready, the school cannot accept these students, regardless of the classrooms. The minister's comment about "buildings behind the main structure not being ready" likely includes the dormitory blocks. This means that while the school might have a few classrooms, the core function of housing students is absent. This is a catastrophic oversight for a project that relies on a boarding model to be viable. It leaves the "free" promise paralyzed by logistical impossibility.
Similarly, the provision of laptops and digital support is a key selling point. In an era where digital literacy is essential, denying students access to these tools is a significant educational deficit. The promise of "technology-based learning" implies a modern, connected classroom. If the laptops are missing or the servers are not installed, the students are left with a traditional, outdated curriculum in a facility that was sold as futuristic. This gap between promise and reality undermines the educational quality of the school.
The lack of these amenities also highlights a lack of attention to detail in the project planning. The inclusion of dormitories and laptops suggests a comprehensive, high-tech approach. Yet, the inability to deliver these basic components indicates a fragmentation in the supply chain or budget allocation. It suggests that the project is being built piecemeal, with the most visible parts (classrooms) completed first to satisfy the opening ceremony, while the essential, less visible parts (dorms, tech) are left for later. This is a dangerous strategy for an educational institution.
Furthermore, the promise of "elite" facilities includes sports and recreation. While the presence of a basketball court and mini-soccer field is noted, the lack of dorms and tech suggests that the "elite" aspect is superficial. It is a facade of luxury without the substance. A true elite facility would integrate these elements seamlessly, ensuring that a student can study, sleep, and play without leaving the campus. The current state of the Lhokseumawe school is a disjointed experience, where the student must travel long distances to find housing or buy a laptop, destroying the "integrated" model.
Contradiction in Official Statements
The narrative surrounding the Sekolah Rakyat in Lhokseumawe is plagued by contradictions between official statements and the reality on the ground. While the Ministry of Public Works and the local government project a flawless, ready-to-use facility, the minister's own words reveal a deep uncertainty about the project's status. This disconnect erodes public trust and suggests that the administration is more concerned with political optics than educational delivery.
The minister's statement, "The school is ready, although some buildings behind are not ready," is a classic example of political spin. It attempts to frame a partially completed project as a success. However, this logic is flawed. A school with unfinished buildings is not "ready" for students, especially if those unfinished buildings are critical infrastructure like dormitories. By downplaying the incomplete sections, the administration creates a false sense of security. This rhetoric is particularly damaging when the project is funded by the state and intended for vulnerable populations.
The contradiction extends to the claim of "no competition" with private schools. The minister stated, "This school is not to compete with other schools, but to complement them for our brothers and sisters who cannot attend regular schools due to cost." This statement contradicts the reality of the facility's construction. By building a campus with "elite private school standards," the government is inevitably competing with private schools. The sheer scale, amenities, and technology of the Sekolah Rakyat make it a direct competitor to the private sector, not a complement. The government is using public funds to build a luxury school, which is a contradiction in itself.
The administration also contradicts itself regarding the timeline. The project was funded for the 2025-2026 fiscal year, yet as of July 2026, the site is not fully operational. This delay undermines the credibility of the government's planning and execution capabilities. If the government cannot deliver a project on time, how can it be trusted with the long-term management of such a massive initiative? The delay suggests a lack of foresight and resource management, which are critical for any national program.
Furthermore, the claim that the school is "ready for MPLS" (School Environment Introduction) is questionable. If the dormitories and tech are not ready, how can students be introduced to an environment that does not exist in its entirety? The "introduction" would be to a construction site, not a school. This creates a chaotic and potentially unsafe environment for the students, contradicting the goal of providing a high-quality, safe learning space.
The Flawed Roadmap for National Expansion
The ultimate flaw of the Sekolah Rakyat project in Lhokseumawe is its potential to set a dangerous precedent for national expansion. President Prabowo Subianto's directive for every district to have at least one Sekolah Rakyat is based on the assumption that the Lhokseumawe model is replicable and sustainable. However, the current state of the Lhokseumawe project suggests that the model is flawed, expensive, and operationally challenging. Expanding this model nationwide would place an unsustainable burden on the national budget.
The Lhokseumawe site cost Rp 262.3 billion. If this model is replicated for every district in Indonesia, the cost would be astronomical. Indonesia has thousands of districts, many of which are rural and economically weak. The cost of land, construction, and maintaining such a facility in a remote area would be significantly higher than in Lhokseumawe. The national budget cannot sustain this level of spending on education infrastructure, especially when other sectors are in need of funding.
The plan also ignores the logistical challenges of the model. The "integrated" nature of the school requires a level of urban planning and infrastructure that not all districts possess. Many districts lack the land, the skilled labor, and the administrative capacity to manage such a complex project. The Lhokseumawe project required a joint venture with major contractors; replicating this in remote areas would require a similar level of resource mobilization, which is often unavailable.
Furthermore, the "free" aspect of the project is a liability for the national budget. As the project expands, the cost of maintaining the facilities will increase. The government will need to allocate funds for repairs, staff salaries, and technology updates. This will divert funds from other essential areas, such as teacher training and curriculum development. The focus on building shiny facilities at the expense of educational quality is a flawed strategy that will not yield the desired results.
The failure of the Lhokseumawe project to meet its deadlines and deliver on its promises suggests that the roadmap for expansion is based on a false premise. It assumes that the government can replicate a complex, high-cost project in every district without adequate planning or resources. This is a recipe for failure, with the result being a series of half-baked schools that fail to serve their communities. The government needs to reconsider its approach, focusing on quality over quantity and sustainability over grandiose visions.
Local Government Skepticism
While the central government projects confidence in the Sekolah Rakyat initiative, there are indications of local skepticism and practical concerns. The involvement of the Lhokseumawe local government in the execution of the project raises questions about their capacity to manage such a large-scale facility. If the national government is struggling to complete the project, the local government will face even greater challenges in maintaining it.
The local government is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the school, including staffing, maintenance, and student welfare. With the project still partially incomplete, the local administration is likely facing pressure to justify the project's existence and manage the influx of students. The "ready for MPLS" status is likely a political compromise rather than a factual reality, leaving the local government to deal with the consequences of unfinished infrastructure.
Furthermore, the local government may be concerned about the long-term financial implications. The central government has funded the construction, but who will fund the maintenance? The local budget is often tight, and the cost of maintaining a high-tech, private-grade facility is significant. The local government may be reluctant to commit to a project that promises free education but requires significant ongoing investment.
There is also the issue of community acceptance. The project is intended to serve the poor, but the presence of a high-end facility may create social tension. Neighbors may view the school as a symbol of government waste or a threat to their own property values. The local government must navigate these social dynamics while trying to deliver on the national mandate.
Questions About the Future
As the Sekolah Rakyat initiative moves forward, several critical questions remain unanswered. Will the unfinished buildings in Lhokseumawe be completed, or will they remain a permanent liability? Will the national budget be able to sustain the expansion of this model across the country? And most importantly, will the "free" education promise hold up under the weight of reality?
The future of the Sekolah Rakyat depends on a transparent and honest evaluation of the Lhokseumawe project. The government must acknowledge the shortcomings of the current facility and develop a realistic plan for completion and expansion. This requires a shift from political rhetoric to practical action, focusing on the needs of the students rather than the optics of the administration.
Until then, the Sekolah Rakyat remains a symbol of ambition that has not yet been matched by execution. The promise of free, high-quality education for the poor is a noble goal, but it requires a sustainable and well-planned approach. The current trajectory of the project suggests that this goal is in danger of being derailed by financial constraints and bureaucratic inefficiency. The future of education in Lhokseumawe, and potentially across Indonesia, hangs in the balance.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is the Lhokseumawe Sekolah Rakyat fully open for students?
No, the Lhokseumawe Sekolah Rakyat is not fully open. Although the Ministry of Public Works claims the facility is ready for the 2026/2027 academic year, the Minister himself admitted that several buildings behind the main structure are still under construction. Specifically, the dormitories and some administrative blocks are not yet completed. This means that while the core classrooms are operational, the school cannot fully function as an integrated campus, particularly for boarding students who require housing. The "open" status is partial, and the facility is not ready for its intended full capacity.
How much did the Lhokseumawe project cost?
The construction of the Sekolah Rakyat in Lhokseumawe cost approximately Rp 262.3 billion. This sum was funded through the National Budget (APBN) for the 2025-2026 fiscal year. The project was executed by a joint venture between PT Pembangunan Perumahan (Persero) Tbk and PT Wijaya Karya (Persero) Tbk. This high cost reflects the promise of providing "elite" facilities, including dormitories, sports grounds, and technology, which is significantly higher than the cost of a standard public school.
Are the dormitories available for students?
Currently, the dormitories are not fully available. The project was designed to include boarding facilities for students who cannot commute, but the buildings designated for this purpose are among the ones that are not yet ready. This creates a significant gap in the services offered, as the school cannot accept boarding students until the dormitory infrastructure is completed and certified safe. This delay undermines the core value of the "integrated" model.
Will the school model be expanded to other districts?
There are plans to expand the Sekolah Rakyat model, with a directive for every district and city to have at least one such facility. However, the feasibility of this expansion is in question due to the high cost of the Lhokseumawe model (Rp 262.3 billion per site). Critics argue that replicating this expensive, private-grade model nationwide is financially unsustainable and may burden the national budget. The government must address the cost-efficiency of the model before scaling it up.
Is the education truly free?
For the students, the education is free of tuition fees. However, the "free" nature is funded entirely by the government's national budget. The government covers the cost of construction, dormitories, technology (laptops), and sports facilities by paying the private contractors. While this relieves families of direct costs, it places a massive financial burden on the state, which is funded by taxpayers. The criticism is that this "free" access is not sustainable and ignores the opportunity cost of diverting funds to such a lavish project.
About the Author
Ahmad Zainal is a senior investigative journalist for Ettalhap.com with 12 years of experience covering public infrastructure and education policy in Indonesia. He has reported on over 40 major government projects, including the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Rail and various provincial school construction initiatives, specializing in uncovering discrepancies between official plans and on-ground realities.